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Appendix to "Weather Risk, Wages in Kind, and the OffFarm Labor Sup ply of Agricultural Households in a Developing Country"
Appendix I: Comparative Statics
This appendix provides a comparativestatic analysis of � j (X p , X w , Σ), j = a, b, c, d (the optimal labor supply shares). In the comparativestatic analysis, the term v y in the first order conditions (5) and (6) is the key. Applying a Taylor approximation to v y and then totally differentiating Roy's identity, we obtain:
ȳ p where ψ (≡ −yv yy /v y ) is the ArrowPratt measure of relative risk aversion, s (≡ pq/y, where q is the Marshallian demand for food) is the budget share of food, and η (≡ ∂ ln q/∂ ln y) is the income elasticity of food demand. ψ, s, and η are all evaluated at the means of y and p so that they are treated as constant in the following exposition. Note that the assumption of v yp > 0 is equivalent to the assumption of ψ > η in this approximation, which is likely to be satisfied for lowincome households (Fafchamps 1992) . where σ k is the coefficient of variation of θ k (note that the mean of θ k is one), ρ is the correlation coefficient, 0 < ρ ab < ρ ac , and 0 < ρ b < ρ c . We also assume that the magnitudes of σ j (j = a, b, c, d) are not very different. By inserting (9) and (10) into the first order conditions (5) and (6), we obtain a system of equations, based on which we conduct the comparativestatic analysis.
Since the system cannot be analyzed without additional restrictions, we investigate the simplest case for which it is possible to obtain analytical results and which is useful to un derstand the riskaversion mechanism underlying the optimal labor choice. More concretely, we begin with the case when the total labor supply is fixed at ¯ L, ignoring the laborleisure
which can be solved to obtain a closedform solution. Letting D denote the determinant of the threebythree matrix above, i.e.,
we obtain the following closedform solution:
Now we investigate the comparative statics with respect to σ a . First, a numerical example is shown in Figure A Regarding the impact of farm income risk on the farm labor share, we take the partial derivative of (13) and obtain
In general, the sign of the above expression is indeterminate. However, with some additional assumptions, we can show that ∂� a /∂σ a < 0. First,
Note that ∂Q a /∂σ a is more likely to be negative when ρ a < 0, i.e., when farmers enjoy a higher gross income from crops, the food price tends to be lower, which seems to fit the situations in rural India. The assumption of the negative correlation between farm income and food price, ρ a < 0, is not necessary to show our predictions in (8), however. We can obtain a similar conclusion if ρ a is positive but sufficiently small. And third,
Note that ∂D/∂σ a is more likely to be positive when σ a > σ b (σ c ), which seems to fit the situations in rural India, but as shown above, even in the case of σ a ≈ σ b (σ c ), it becomes positive if the correlation coefficients are sufficiently small to satisfy ρ ac < 1/2, ρ bc ≤ 1/2 and ρ ac ρ bc /2 ≤ ρ ab < 1/2. Thus, we obtain the relation ∂� a /∂σ a < 0, which predicts that the ownfarm labor supply declines as production becomes riskier. A corollary of this prediction
, which predicts that the sum of the offfarm labor supply shares increases as selfemployed farming becomes riskier.
A.I.2 Impact of Farm Income Risk on Labor Supply to OffFarm Sectors
Now we investigate which among the three offfarm sectors expands most rapidly when self employed farming becomes riskier. First, we examine the choice between agricultural wage work paid in cash and agricultural wage work paid in kind. Taking the partial derivatives of (14) and (15), we obtain
The sign of the above expression depends on the signs of
, and ∂D/∂σ a . As shown for the case of ∂� a /∂σ a , it is likely that ∂D/∂σ a > 0.
Furthermore,
>0
Therefore, if we additionally assume that ρ a < 0 and the correlation between cash and in kind wages in agricultural labor market is moderately high so that ρ bc > ρ ab ρ ac , which seems plausible in the context of rural India, we can assign the sign of ∂(Q c − Q b )/∂σ a as positive.
Thus, when � c ≤ � b and ∂(R c − R b )/∂σ a ≥ 0, we obtain the relation ∂(� c − � b )/∂σ a > 0, which predicts that the labor supply share to wage work paid in kind increases more rapidly than that to wage work paid in cash, as selfemployed farming becomes riskier. When
/∂σ a is indeterminate, although it is more likely to be positive when s �� is large, i.e., the household's food budget share is high, the household is highly risk averse, and the household's food demand is inelastic. In the numerical simulation, the positive effect of
is positive and ∂(R c − R b )/∂σ a is negative.
Finally, we investigate the choice between agricultural and nonagricultural wage work.
From (14) and (16), we obtain
A5
We already showed that the combination of ∂R a /∂σ a < 0, ∂Q a /∂σ a < 0, and ∂D/∂σ a > 0 is 
A.I.3 Allowing for the LaborLeisure Choice
We briefly sketch the case when we allow for the laborleisure choice. By solving the first order conditions (5) and (6) and applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain the reducedform solution for the total labor supply, L * = L(X p , X w , Σ). Meanwhile, we can solve the first order condition (5) only and derive the partially reducedform solution,
The first term of (18) is what we discussed in the comparative analysis above. The second term of (18) is the additional impact attributable to the endogeneity of the labor leisure choice. This decomposition thus shows that the previous argument is valid even when we allow for the laborleisure choice if we reinterpret the above exercise as the comparative
Furthermore, in the specific cases investigated in this appendix, ∂� j (L * , X p , X w , Σ)/∂L * = 0 when y 0 = 0, because s �� does not depend on L * when y 0 = 0 (remember that we approximate risk and consumption preference parameters at the expected values of y and p, and we assume the production technology to be constantreturnstoscale). We also obtained the results that ∂� j (L * , X p , X w , Σ)/∂σ a ≈ ∂� j (X p , X w , Σ)/∂σ a from numerical exercises that are extended from the one leading to Figure A .1 to allow for the laborlesire choice. In other words, in empirical situations corresponding to rural India, where the dominant share of income of the poor comes from their hard labor, the theoretical predictions on the optimal labor supply shares derived under the assumption that the total labor supply is fixed are reasonable approximations for those on the optimal labor supply shares allowing for the laborleisure choice.
Appendix II: Robustness Checks
In this appendix, we conduct several robustness checks of our main result shown in In the default specification, various variables at the district level are included, to control for the demand factors and other local conditions that affect labor allocations by farmers.
Nevertheless, a suspicion of omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out. For instance, it is possible that the districts are different in terms of labor market conditions, this heterogeneity is not controlled adequately in our main result, and the heterogeneity is correlated with the variable CV of rainfal l. In order to examine whether the bias due to this heterogeneity is substantial, we estimate the labor supply model with district dummies included, instead of district characteristics and rainfall variables. If the coefficients on householdlevel and village level variables change substantially from our main result, a suspicion of omitted variable bias could be raised. By using a Wald test, we test the null hypothesis that the coefficient
estimates in our main result and those in the regression with district dummies are equal. The test results indicate that the difference in the estimates is not statistically significant. To show that the omitted variable bias is likely to be small from a different angle, we reestimate the model without districtlevel variables except for CV of rainfal l and Rainfal l shock variables.
The estimation results regarding CV of rainfal l are reported in 
Appendix III: Simulation Procedure
In this appendix, we explain the simulation procedure used to obtain the results reported in table 5. We follow the procedure outlined by Cornick et al. (1994) .
First, we simulate T runs of a (4×1) vector of error terms u using Cholesky factorization of the covariance matrix � Σ estimated by the multivariate tobit model:
where S t is a (4 × 1) vector of random numbers obtained from a univariate standard normal distribution in the tth trial, and L is a lower triangular matrix defined in the last equation of (21). Then for each run, we assign each observation (household) to a pattern of labor allocation shown in table 1, and obtain the following two pattern vectors, both of which are 4 × 1 (N: interior and C: corner solution outcome): Using these pattern vectors and letting � k = Xβ k + � � u k , we approximate the probabilities that a household allocates labor to each type of work by the followings.
In addition, the expected labor supply share is given by
Therefore, E[� k ] can be estimated by using the predicted probabilities, Pr(100 > � k > 0) �ã nd Pr(� k ≥ 100) in equation (22), and the expected value of error terms conditional on
Note that the reported figures in table 6 are the mean predicted values when T is set to 50. The simulation results are not sensitive to marginal changes in T around 50. 
